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- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

Contents

	<u>Page</u>
<u>Testimony of</u>	
E. Howard Hunt	2
Accompanied by:	
Randall Coleman	

Exhibits

<u>Exhibit</u>	<u>Page</u>
Hunt Exhibit No. 1	3
Hunt Exhibit No. 2	5
Hunt Exhibit No. 3	6
Hunt Exhibit No. 4	7
Hunt Exhibit No. 5	20
Hunt Exhibit No. 6	48
Hunt Exhibit No. 7	62

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Saturday, January 10, 1976

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, -D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 o'clock
p.m., at Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Walton, Florida.

Present: Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Member.

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1 STATEMENT OF E. HOWARD HUNT

2 ACCOMPANIED BY: RANDALL COLEMAN

3 Mr. Baron. Mr. Hunt, as we were discussing off the record,
4 we have to start with some formalities, namely, advising you
5 of your rights.

6 As you surely must know, you have a right to counsel and
7 you are appearing here with your counsel, Mr. Randall Coleman
8 here.

9 Is that correct?

10 Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

11 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have the right
12 at any point to cease answering questions and consult with your
13 counsel?

14 Mr. Hunt. I am aware of that right.

15 Mr. Baron. Are you further aware that you have all of
16 your constitutional rights intact before the Committee, including
17 your Fifth Amendment privileges?

18 Mr. Hunt. Yes, I'm aware of that.

19 Mr. Baron. Finally, as we were discussing off the
20 record, we are taking your testimony today in contemplation
21 of having you swear to it as soon as possible after we are
22 done. There is no Senator present here today and you are
23 free to stop answering questions or to inform us that you
24 are answering in a manner that you consider to be not under
25 oath at any point that you would like to make that clear.

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but I would like to get your consent now to answer questions in contemplation of swearing to them.

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Under the rules of the Committee, you have the right to make a preliminary statement and you might also want to make any closing statement that you have at the end of our session tomorrow. But I see that you have a prepared statement, and why don't you read that into the record?

Mr. Hunt. I do. Do you want me to read it into the record formally or simply pass it over?

Mr. Baron. Well, we can submit it as an exhibit. Let's mark this statement, which is headed "Statement by E. Howard Hunt," as Hunt Exhibit 1.

(The document referred to was marked as Hunt Exhibit 1 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Hunt. And you witnessed my signature. I just signed
2 it before you.

3 Mr. Baron. It's signed E. Howard Hunt, January 10, 1976,
4 and was just signed in my presence.

5 Because the first subject that I would like to inquire into
6 is your interview with John Crewdson of the New York Times
7 relating to Colonel Boris Pash, may I ask you to read into the
8 record now just as an introduction this paragraph that relates
9 to that New York Times interview, the paragraph of your
10 preliminary statement.

11 This is on page 2.

12 Mr. Hunt. I read from my prepared statement on page 2.
13 It is the first full paragraph on that page.

14 "In December, 1975, John Crewdson of the New York Times
15 interviewed me in prison. He asked if I knew anything about
16 'CIA assassination capabilities,' and I related to him my
17 encounter with Colonel Boris T. Pash. Mr. Crewdson then
18 inquired whether the Church Committee had interviewed me.
19 I responded in terms of the foregoing noting that I would have
20 testified about the Pash encounter had I been given the
21 publicized opportunity. My interview with Mr. Crewdson was
22 published and shortly thereafter my attorney was contacted
23 by a representative of the Committee."

24 Mr. Baron. I think the place to start is I'd like to
25 give you a fairly open-ended chance to put on this record the

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same story that you gave to John Crewdson and why don't we first introduce the Crewdson story as Exhibit 2, which is entitled "Hunt Says CIA Had Assassin Unit," and is dated December 26, 1975.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 2.)

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Mr. Baron. Why don't you give me an account in your own words now of this allegation that there was a small unit set up to arrange for the assassination of suspected double agents at the CIA, which was headed by Boris Pash.

Mr. Hunt. Very well. I will have to go back considerably in time to the period in 1954 and early 1955 when I was a staff officer of the Southeast European Division of the Central Intelligence Agency.

My title was Chief of Political and Psychological Warfare for Southeast Europe. As such, I had a staff responsibility to the Chief of the Division for all political and psychological warfare matters that involved the following countries: Albania, Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Trieste, and Bulgaria.

I have a rough sketch of the division organization at that time, and I don't know if you want to make an exhibit of it, but it's at least something that we can refer to for clarification purposes.

Mr. Baron. I think this is helpful and why don't we, with your permission, introduce as Exhibit 3 and then Exhibit 4 the two charts that you have prepared.

Exhibit 3 would be headed "SE division."

Mr. Hunt. Table of Organization is what it is.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 3)

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Mr. Baron. And Exhibit 4 is headed PE Staff, and PE stands for --

Mr. Hunt. Political and Psychological.

Mr. Coleman. No objection.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 4)

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1 Mr. Hunt. I'm sorry I can't be more precise about the
 2 year but it's now about 20 years ago that this all occurred.
 3 I was of course in daily contact with the chiefs of the various
 4 country branches and it came to my attention that we were
 5 having considerable difficulty with our Albanian guard unit,
 6 I believe it was called, which was then located in West
 7 Germany.

8 This guard unit had been drawn largely from the retainers
 9 of King Zog of Albania. We had been the division, the Agency
 10 in fact, had been encountering a lot of difficulty with losing
 11 agents, Albanian agents who were parachuted into the area.
 12 And as a result of the rapid disappearance of our parachuted
 13 agents, it became a matter of some concern to the Division.

14 To the best of my recollection, the presence of a double
 15 agent or a penetration agent in the Albanian guard unit was
 16 suspected, if not assumed.

17 To that end there was some discussion, the details of
 18 which are no longer clear to me about the best way to cleanse
 19 the unit of whatever offending individual there might be,
 20 the penetration agent. And I don't recall whether I was
 21 specifically commissioned to look into the method of cleansing
 22 or whether it was a matter of my personal interest.

23 But in any event, I inquired around among knowledgeable
 24 people in the Agency and it came to my attention, and I hate,
 25 again, to be so indefinite, although I will speculate on who

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1 might have directed me to this particular unit.

2 I was told that somewhere within the overall political
3 and psychological staff there was located a man with a small
4 office. This man's name was Pash, Colonel Boris Pash, and
5 my understanding was that Colonel Pash had been doing business,
6 let us say, with the Agency in West Germany for quite a while.

7 I sought out Colonel Pash. I was directed to his office
8 and found sitting with him another Agency officer named [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] I'm not sure whether it is [REDACTED]

10 Mr. Baron. It's a Greek name. [REDACTED] is his correct
11 first name, but he goes by [REDACTED]

12 Mr. Hunt. Very good. But in any case, he was known
13 throughout my career as [REDACTED] And I was at that
14 point on, let's say, a search mission to determine whether the
15 alleged capability of Colonel Pash in "wet affairs," which is
16 how it was referred to, that is liquidations, would have any
17 relevance to our particular problem of the Albanian dis-
18 appointments.

19 Mr. Baron. By liquidations, you mean assassinations?

20 Mr. Hunt. Assassinations. Assassinations, kidnappings,
21 removals, let's say.

22 This had been alleged to me. So I spoke to Colonel Pash
23 in Mr. [REDACTED] presence. I explained the problem to him,
24 although at that juncture I'm quite sure that we had not
25 identified the Albanian suspect. So we were talking hypothetically

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1 And I might say parenthetically at this juncture that it
2 became clear many years later that the actual informant was
3 Kim Philby, the British MI-6 Chief who was keeping everyone
4 apprised of our Albanian activities.

5 So in fact we had no nominee for Colonel Pash's special
6 attentions. However, I broached the problem on a hypothetical
7 basis to Colonel Pash, who seemed to, he didn't pick up on it
8 immediately. He seemed a little startled at the subject. He
9 indicated that it was something that would have to be approved
10 by higher authority and I withdrew and never approached
11 Colonel Pash again.

12 Mr. Baron. Where did this take place?

13 Mr. Hunt. This took place in Colonel Pash's office, which,
14 to the best of my recollection, was in the complex in the
15 old JKL series of CIA buildings along the reflecting pool.
16 They have since been demolished.

17 And in Exhibit 4 here I give a breakdown, to the best
18 of my recollection, of the PP staff at that time, which we
19 can go into.

20 I don't want to really interrupt the continuity of what
21 I have to say, but just for clarification, so everybody will
22 know what we're talking about and who was situated where at
23 that time. Then I can go into that apart from this, if that's
24 all right with you.

25 I should also say, and I'm sorry I didn't mention this

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1 earlier, that when I first inquired around for the location of
2 Colonel Pash and his assistant, the reaction I encountered
3 was a rather jesting one, and the impression I gained was
4 here were a couple of men who were drawing salaries and doing
5 very little.

6 And so when Colonel Pash seemed reluctant to become
7 involved in responding affirmatively to my questions, my
8 inference was that Colonel Pash and [REDACTED] could well not
9 have such a capability but for purposes of employment and
10 status, this was the job they had. But they didn't want
11 anyone to call upon them to activate their particular
12 abilities.

13 Now that was my impression, and I was a little disgusted
14 by it. I think I talked to the Chief of the PP staff later,
15 who was of course well aware of the Albanian problem and I
16 said I didn't get any satisfaction from Pash, but it doesn't
17 really make any difference because we don't have the name
18 of the suspected individual.

19 Mr. Baron. Just to stop here for a second and clear up
20 some of these details, were you under the impression that what
21 you called wet affairs, assassinations, kidnappings, or other
22 removals from the scene of troublesome individuals was the
23 primary function of this unit that Pash and [REDACTED] were
24 running?

25 Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact the only. As far as I knew, they

[REDACTED]

1 had no other function. If they had another function, I was
2 never made aware of what it was.

3 Do you know anything about Colonel Pash's background?

4 Mr. Baron. I know a bit, but if you think that there are
5 relevant details to put on the background, go ahead.

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, I had not thought of Colonel Pash for
7 years until I began reading a book called "Lawrence and Oppen-
8 heimer," and I saw quite a few references to Colonel Pash. I
9 had known previously that he had been associated during the
10 war with the Manhattan Project and that he had a security
11 background. And as I believe I touched on briefly before, it
12 was my impression that Pash had been active a couple of years
13 at least before I knew him in West Germany with the sort of
14 thing that we had been discussing so far today.

15 Mr. Baron. What kinds of stories had you heard about
16 Pash's previous activities?

17 Mr. Hunt. Kidnappings mostly.

18 Mr. Baron. And where were those?

19 Mr. Hunt. West Germany and West Berlin.

20 Mr. Baron. Do you know the names of any of the victims
21 of the kidnapping or any of the people involved other than
22 Pash and [REDACTED]

23 Mr. Hunt. I do not.

24 Mr. Baron. And are you aware from whatever source of
25 any assassination planning or attempts that Pash was involved

[REDACTED]

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in?

Mr. Hunt. I am not.

Mr. Baron. Does your answer include not only the period of time before you talked with Colonel Pash but after you talked with Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

I might add that I was rather briefly at CIA headquarters at that time and within a very short period of time after I had had my interview with Colonel Pash, I was transferred to the Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.

Mr. Baron. Is that the reason why you did not follow up on the problem with this particular suspected double agent after not receiving satisfaction from Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. That certainly could have been one reason. On the other hand, I was chief of, I can see I'm really going to have to get into a lot more here. This is going to be dry and dull stuff for you.

[REDACTED]

who was very upset about the disappearance and loss of all of his partisans in the operations that the Agency was conducting

[REDACTED] -- the the counter-intelligence or espionage aspect, which is not my function, but

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Why were they being parachuted to their deaths in Albania? And that was my introduction to the whole scene in West Germany, where the balance of his retainers were being held by the CIA. Well, not being held, but where they were being housed and trained for Albanian operations.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain the term "retainer"?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I understood that when he finally got out of Albania, that he brought with him what I can best describe as retainers. That is bodyguards, members of his personal staff, probably some relatives. I think he had four or five sisters with him. But the able-bodied portion of those loyalists who came out with him we had largely taken over [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] And then he never saw them again. He naturally became apprehensive.

So that was my interest in what was happening to the Albanians that we parachuted in [REDACTED] I had no functional counter-espionage interest in the affair. This would have been handled and this was handled by the Chief of Counter-espionage for the Division.

Mr. Baron. Who would that have been at the time?

Mr. Hunt. I can't remember at this point.

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Mr. Baron. But that would be the person primarily responsible for taking care of this double agent problem?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of what happened with that suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. I have no idea because, as I may have indicated previously off the record, it became apparent some years later that the unfortunate fate of our Albanian agents was linked far more closely to the revelations of Kim Philby, the Soviet agent who was in direct liaison with us in Washington and in Great Britain, rather than any penetration, although the possibility of a penetration was of course always there. But I don't think that anybody was ever focused.

Again, I left for Latin American affairs. I left the Division about that time and I really never heard about it again. [redacted] the Albanian chief, departed for Southeast Asia, and the whole sort of complex of knowledgeable people was broken up through normal transfers and special activities like the Guatemala project.

Mr. Baron. Was [redacted] knowledgeable about your approach to Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Very likely he was, yes. I don't think I would have discussed anything with Colonel Pash about the matter without talking to [redacted] about it.

Mr. Baron. Who else would have known that you approached

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1 Colonel Pash with the idea in mind of seeing if an assassination
2 or a kidnapping couldn't be arranged?

3 Mr. Hunt. The then Chief of Foreign Intelligence and
4 Counter-Intelligence for the Division. And I think now that that
5 was [REDACTED] I think he wore both
6 hats. He had both foreign intelligence responsibility and
7 the counter-intelligence responsibility. And I might have told
8 the division chief about it, although it was not, it had not
9 achieved such stature at that point that I would have
10 necessarily talked to the Division Chief, who I believe at
11 that time was John Richardson of later Vietnam fame.

12 It's also possible that the Division Chief in that era
13 was John Baker, now deceased, who left that division to
14 become Chief of the PP staff, and that would have been a
15 normal follow through for me if I had discussed it with John
16 Baker, my direct Chief, and then to have discussed it with
17 him when he was my staff chief in the overall political and
18 psychological staff.

19 Mr. Baron. Anyone else who would have known about your
20 approach to Colonel Pash or about --

21 Mr. Hunt. Or his function.

22 Mr. Baron. Yes, that Colonel Pash was considered to have
23 assassinations as one of his functions.

24 Mr. Hunt. We had a Colonel Buffington who at that time
25 was a member of the PP staff, the overall PP staff, and I think

[REDACTED]

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that he would have been knowledgeable about it.

Mr. Baron. Was that Milton Buffington?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. I think he later went on and had a career in the Office of Security. Milton Buffington, yes.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I have the names of three men who unfortunately are dead. I could give those names, though. Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. John Baker, who I've already mentioned, and [REDACTED] These men were all at one time or another chiefs of the Agency's PP staff.

Another man now living to the best of my knowledge who might well have had knowledge of Pash's function was the then-chief of the Economic Warfare staff of the PP staff and he

[REDACTED]

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1 name was Gates Lloyd. He later became the Deputy Director for
2 Support of the Agency.

3 There's a man named [REDACTED] who was in the
4 Psychological Warfare Branch of the PP staff. I believe at
5 that time there was an International Organizations Branch
6 which later became the International Organizations Division,
7 then headed by Cord Myer, Jr., and his Deputy at that time was
8 Tom Braden, the now-columnist whose wife has just ascended to
9 the Executive Office Building. There were members of the
10 Labor Branch, and I'm trying to think of that branch of office
11 that was down the hall.

12 There was a labor branch. The people in there might know.
13 There was a lady lawyer named Carol somebody who was very
14 knowledgeable about what was going on in that area.

15 Mr. Baron. Knowledgeable about Pash's activities?

16 Mr. Hunt. Well, in the sense that when you have an
17 adjoining office, you usually pretty much know what the other
18 fellow is doing. Just in that sense, because her function
19 in the labor branch had nothing to do with Pash, to my
20 knowledge.

21 What I'm trying to do here is to give you sort of a
22 congeries of people alive and dead who would have had contact
23 knowledge, at the very least, of what Pash's function was.

24 Mr. Baron. Were each of these units referred to as
25 PB with a number following it?

[REDACTED]

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Mr. Hunt. PB?

Mr. Baron. In other words, what they called Planning Branch or Program Branch?

Mr. Hunt. I think that was an earlier designation. I don't really think -- of course I was out of the staff. I started in Frank Wisner's organization.

Mr. Baron. OPC?

Mr. Hunt. OPC. And then went into functional activities rather than staff activities. I think that in the very early days it was like PB-1, or PB/. But I think that in the era we are now discussing, which is five or six years after I had joined the Agency, that by that time they had a verbal designator rather than numerical and digraphed designators.

Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency?

Mr. Hunt. In the fall of '49.

Mr. Baron. Can you describe the place on a larger organization chart of the Agency on this PP staff?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I can. Do you have such a chart?

Mr. Baron. I don't have a chart, but what I want to know is who would the chief of the staff be responsible to?

Mr. Hunt. The Chief of the PP staff -- why don't I just draw this up for you and then we can discuss it for a minute?

(Pause)

Mr. Hunt. In that era following the merger of the Special

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1 Operations and OPC, the staff structure emerged as follows:
 2 Reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans, i.e. Frank
 3 Wisner, whose Chief of Operations then was Richard Helms, this
 4 is the Clandestine Services Organization. There was our
 5 support staff, the PP staff, the Foreign Intelligence staff,
 6 the Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Espionage staff, and of
 7 course the famous staff "D".

8 Also reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans were all
 9 of the geographical divisions, such as Western Europe, Southeast
 10 Europe, Asia, Near East, and so forth.

11 Mr. Baron. Now at this point Frank Wisner was DDP,
 12 Richard Helms was his deputy.

13 Mr. Hunt. Richard Helms was his Chief of Operations.

14 Mr. Baron. All right. The Chief of the PP staff was --

15 Mr. Hunt. Either Tracy Barnes or John Baker or [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 Mr. Baron. And you were located on the South European --

18 Mr. Hunt. Southern Europe Division.

19 Mr. Baron. Who headed that division at that point?

20 Mr. Hunt. Either John Baker or John Richardson.

21 So as you see, I had a line responsibility to the Chief
 22 of the Southeast Europe Division, as indicated in Exhibit J.
 23 At the same time I had a functional responsibility to the
 24 Chief of the PP staff, who was Mr. Barnes or Mr. Baker or
 25 [REDACTED] just as the Chief of PI for the Southeast Europe

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1 Division had a functional responsibility to the Chief of the
2 PI staff.

3 Mr. Baron. And Colonel Pash would have been directly
4 responsible to the Chief of the PP staff.

5 Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

6 Mr. Baron. Now again, your attaching the names that
7 you did to this chart, is based on your sense of where things
8 stood in 1954 and '55.

9 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

10 Mr. Coleman. Let me interrupt. I think you may want to
11 mark that. It has not been marked as an exhibit.

12 Mr. Baron. Sure. Let's mark as Exhibit 5 the rough
13 sketch of an organization chart under the DD/P that we have
14 just been discussing.

(The document referred to was
marked for identification as
Hunt Exhibit No. 5)

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Mr. Hunt. Does this satisfy your request?

Mr. Baron. It does, indeed.

Of all of the individuals that you have just mentioned, which ones do you know to your own certainty were clearly knowledgeable of Boris Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. [REDACTED] would be the first one, and after that I can only speculate. I would have to assume that [REDACTED] acquired knowledge of it, but perhaps he acquired knowledge through me. I'm not sure. I have made a list of other people whom I have not mentioned who conceivably, by virtue of personal contact or functional responsibility, might well have been aware of Pash's true functional responsibility within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. Before I ask you to tick off that list, let's make it clear that all of the names, in addition to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] are names that you have given as people who are likely to have been knowledgeable of Pash's activities because of their place in the organization structure at that time.

Mr. Hunt. That's correct, or as I have indicated in some cases, as with the PP labor branch by virtue of physical proximity to that office.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Why don't you now just run very briefly through the names of other people who you think could conceivably have been knowledgeable of Pash's function?

Mr. Hunt. In some cases I'm going to have to give you their

[REDACTED]

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1 title designation rather than the name of the individual because
2 so much time has passed, I have simply forgotten who it was
3 in that particular era.

4 [REDACTED] who at that time was a member of the German
5 branch of the Western Europe Division, he has since retired
6 and is running his family's [REDACTED] business in New York. Certainly
7 the then Chief of Western Europe Division, of which Germany
8 was a functional part and the Chief of Operations of Western
9 Europe should know.

10 I would think that Jim Angleton, who would have had
11 direct knowledge and always was the Chief of the CI/CE staff.
12 The Chief of base in [REDACTED] if in fact Pash conducted any
13 activities in that area, certainly the Chief of base in
14 [REDACTED] would have been knowledgeable about it.

15 Also, the Chief of base at [REDACTED] which was where we
16 had the [REDACTED] operation going on. I don't know whether
17 Bill Harvy, that is William Harvy, at that time was Chief of
18 Operations [REDACTED] or whether he was simply running the
19 tunnel, but Harvy might well have some knowledge of Pash.

20 I would certainly assume that when we're talking about
21 liquidations and that sort of thing that the Agency's overall
22 Office of Security somewhere within it must have been involved,
23 such German Division personnel as might be available today,
24 West German, and I would also suggest that General Cushman might
25 be knowledgeable for this reason.

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It was about that time that General Cushman was still assigned to the CIA. I could be wrong about that but I seem to have a memory of Cushman being around in those days. He was then a Colonel. I had associated with him. In fact, we had shared an office at one time, but that was several years earlier. I would place it about early 1949. But I'm quite sure that Cushman was around in that period of time and involved with the PP staff, though what his function was I don't know.

Now there are alive two close friends of mine who were then members of the PP staff, [redacted] and [redacted]. These are men who in effect established the PP staff for Frank Wisner and then left to go on to other things. They are both well known writers.

Mr. Baron. Let me just return to one name that you mentioned and that is William Harvey.

Did you -- first, generally, what was the nature of your operational relationships to William Harvey after this period?

Did you have any?

Mr. Hunt. I never had any, no. In fact, I've only seen him once in my life, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Baron. As you may know, William Harvey was tasked in 1961 with setting up an executive action capability at the CIA, tasked originally by Richard Bissell to carry out assassinations if required.

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1 Do you have any knowledge from any source of any connection
2 between what Harvey was doing in the early '60s in relation
3 to assassination attempts or executive action capabilities
4 and what General Pash was doing in the '50s, according to your
5 story?

6 Mr. Hunt. No, I can't draw any relationship, really,
7 although, if I can strain your patience a little, I would like
8 to go, to just simply refer to an incident that I recorded in
9 my book, "Give Us This Day," which had to do with the Bay of
10 Pigs, in which following my survey trip to Havana in late '59
11 or early '60, I had made a number of recommendations for
12 Bissell and Barnes and the top one was that consideration be
13 given to having Castro assassinated and I appended the remark
14 that this was a job for Cuban patriots.

15 I would like to dilate a bit on that because it never
16 occurred to me that the Agency did not have an assassination
17 capability. This perhaps was as a result of my earlier contact
18 with Colonel Pash or what I heard about him, and that is another
19 reason why I indicated in my written report that this was a
20 job for Cuban patriots.

21 In other words, I was making a clear distinction. I was
22 saying to Mr. Bissell, I don't feel this is something that
23 one of our people ought to do because there are plenty of people
24 who are available on the outside.

25 And then if I can just go on a bit to what happened with that

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1 I asked Mr. Bissell at a later time if any action was being
2 taken on my recommendation, and particularly on my first
3 recommendation.

4 Mr. Baron. The assassination recommendation?

5 Mr. Hunt. The assassination recommendation, yes. And he
6 told me, he said, well, that's in the hands either of a group
7 or the group. And at this distance in time I simply can't
8 tell what it was he said,

9 But my understanding was at that point contemporaneously
10 that the matter was being looked into and taken care of and
11 indeed, following some of the testimony that I've since read
12 as a result of the Church Committee hearings, it's my
13 understanding that the matter was in hand long before I made
14 my survey trip to Havana.

15 Mr. Baron. I glanced at your book briefly, and I saw
16 that passage and I recall that it says that the response you
17 received was that it was in the hands of a special group.

18 Is that your recollection?

19 Mr. Hunt. I'm glad to have you refresh that. You're
20 quite right. Of course that brings me to the problem now
21 of knowing whether Bissell meant the special group.

22 Mr. Baron. Which would be a sub-unit of the National
23 Security Council.

24 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

25 Mr. Baron. Did you at the time know whether that was what

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1 he was referring to?

2 Mr. Hunt. No, I did not. But obviously, my memory of
3 events was a lot better in say 1967 than it is now in 1976.

4 Mr. Baron. Was there anything that you learned after that
5 interchange that led you to believe that he was referring to
6 the Special Group of the NSC?

7 Mr. Hunt. No, sir.

8 Mr. Baron. Did you ever learn any more about the group
9 that he was referring to that had assassinations in hand?

10 Mr. Hunt. Not specifically. I was made aware of during
11 my numerous trips back to Washington from the Miami area where
12 I was based during the Cuba operation, that attempts were going
13 ahead, were moving forward to kill off Castro.

14 I was told, for example, about the box of poison cigars.
15 I knew about that. I heard collaterally, I think, from someone
16 in the paramilitary side that a bazooka had been furnished
17 to some Cuban patriotic team as well as telescopic rifles.
18 But this was not my bag. I had no functional responsibility
19 for it. Everything was handled on a need to know basis and
20 I never inquired further into those matters.

21 Mr. Baron. What names did you know as being associated
22 with the bazooka incident?

23 In other words, who were the CIA personnel and who were
24 the Cubans involved?

25 Mr. Hunt. I have no idea. I would hazard one guess --

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1 Rip Robertson, who I believe is dead. It was sort of his type
2 of thing.

3 Mr. Baron. But that's strictly a guess?

4 Mr. Hunt. That's a guess, yes.

5 Mr. Baron. On the telescopic rifles, do you know who
6 was supplying them on the CIA side and who was receiving them
7 on the Cuban side?

8 Mr. Hunt. I don't know and I ought to say parenthetically
9 that I was not aware that Bill Harvey at that juncture had
10 anything to do with the Cuban operations. I don't think it was un-
11 til after the failure of the Bay of Pigs that he surfaced as
12 the Chief of sort of the pick-up unit that I became aware that
13 he had any Cuban involvement at all.

14 Mr. Baron. So you were never aware of a plot to use
15 poison pills against Castro?

16 Mr. Hunt. No.

17 Mr. Baron. On the poison cigar scheme, do you know
18 anyone who was involved with that?

19 Mr. Hunt. I don't know anyone. I think that Gerard
20 Droller told me about it during one of my trips to Washington.

21 Mr. Baron. Where was he at the time?

22 Mr. Hunt. He was my back-up man in Washington. He was
23 the Chief of Political Action for the Cuba project.

24 Mr. Baron. Were there any other specific assassination
25 plans that you were knowledgeable of?

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1 Mr. Hunt. With regard to Castro?
 2 Mr. Baron. With regard to Castro.
 3 Mr. Hunt. No. Well, I'll answer your question no. I
 4 will then go on to say that in the exile milieu in which I
 5 was living in Miami for those many months, and also travelling
 6 as frequently as I had to into Mexico and Guatemala, that
 7 you could hardly draw a breath or smoke a cigarette without
 8 hearing about some project. And people would come up to you
 9 and say, so and so will do the job if he can just get the
 10 necessary --

11 But this sort of thing I kept far, far away from because
 12 our political action activities at that time were so urgent
 13 that we needed unification rather than anything that might
 14 possibly split the Revolutionary Democratic Front, that I
 15 did not want to involve myself or any of my Cuban proteges
 16 in anything like that.

17 What they did on their own outside office hours I felt
 18 was up to them. But I never encouraged anyone to do it because
 19 as I say, Bissell had assured me that the matter that I had
 20 recommended was in the hands of a special group or the special
 21 group.

22 So I thought no more about it.

23 Mr. Baron. Did you ever plan or mount any action toward
 24 assassinating Castro?

25 Mr. Hunt. No, I did not. That was not a functional

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1 responsibility of mine. I had a political action responsibility.
2 Anything in that line would have been under the para-military
3 group, Colonel Hawkins and those people.

4 Mr. Baron. While we are out on this limb away from the
5 details of the Pash story, let's follow up for a minute.

6 Were you knowledgeable about any assassination planning
7 or the mounting of any assassination operation against other
8 foreign leaders than Castro?

9 Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

10 Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any assassination planning
11 or assassination action against any domestic political
12 leaders?

13 Mr. Hunt. No.

14 Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any planning or action
15 toward the targeted killing of any other specific individuals
16 by the CIA?

17 Mr. Hunt. Let me just take a moment to reflect on that.
18 Now let's see, who have you covered so far in your hearings?
19 You had Lumumba and Castro and Trujillo. Well, I knew that
20 was going on. That was an ongoing thing for a long, long
21 time.

22 Mr. Baron. You're referring to Trujillo?

23 Mr. Hunt. Trujillo, yes, because of my intimacy with
24 Latin American affairs.

25 Mr. Baron. Were you knowledgeable of the plots to kill



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1 Lumumba?

2 Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

3 Mr. Baron. Let me just give you a list of names that
4 have been suggested from time to time -- Ho Chi Minh.

5 Mr. Hunt. No.

6 Mr. Baron. Chou En Lai.

7 Mr. Hunt. No.

8 Mr. Baron. Chaing Kai Shek.

9 Mr. Hunt. No.

10 Mr. Baron. Nasser.

11 Mr. Hunt. No.

12 Mr. Baron. You weren't aware of --

13 Mr. Hunt. I hesitated because of Maguib, who preceded
14 him and of course was overthrown. But no.

15 Mr. Baron. Here again, I'm not asking about general
16 covert actions to overthrow a government but rather targeted --

17 Mr. Hunt. Targeted assassinations, yes.

18 Mr. Baron. Plans or attempts.

19 What about DeGaulle?

20 Mr. Hunt. No.

21 Mr. Baron. Duvalier.

22 Mr. Hunt. No.

23 Mr. Baron. Salvadore Allende.

24 Mr. Hunt. No.

25 Mr. Baron. Aside from this list we have just gone through,

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1 are you knowledgeable of any CIA assassination planning or
2 activities against any foreign or domestic leaders?

3 Mr. Hunt. I am not.

4 Mr. Baron. Now when you stopped to reflect, I had asked
5 a question that did not involve leaders but involved any
6 planning or action against lower ranking individuals or
7 conceivably individuals who were not even in a government but
8 targeted killing as opposed to general covert actions.

9 Were you aware of any such things?

10 Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

11 Mr. Baron. And this would include any knowledge that
12 you might have of actions or plans to eliminate double agents
13 or suspected double agents?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

15 Mr. Baron. And I realize I am being painfully meticulous
16 here.

17 Mr. Hunt. Oh, that's all right. I want you to be. I
18 want you to be painstaking about these things.

19 Mr. Baron. So aside from the incidents that you had
20 specifically mentioned already where you had knowledge of
21 some assassination plan or activity, you have no other knowledge
22 of CIA assassination planning or activity.

23 Mr. Hunt. That is correct. Well, assassination, that
24 brings us into -- can we go off the record for a moment?

25 (Discussion off the record)

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1 Mr. Baron. While we were off the record, we agreed to
2 hold discussion on the allegation of some action against
3 Jack Anderson, because as you have indicated to me, and correct
4 me if I am wrong, it did not involve in your mind assassination.

5 Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

6 Mr. Baron. But you did raise with me off the record
7 a question in your own mind about the nature of Dr. Gunn's
8 activities.

9 Can you just describe whatever you know about any rela-
10 tion between Dr. Gunn's activities and assassination planning
11 or attempts?

12 Mr. Hunt. Well, we are talking for the record about Dr.
13 Edward Gunn, I believe his name is. He was known in the
14 Agency as Dr. Manny Gunn. He became known to me as sort of
15 the unorthodox, or as an unorthodox practitioner of medicine
16 in the sense that if you needed something, some recherche
17 medical information, you went to Manny Gunn and he provided
18 it.

19 It develops now that in recent months they say that he
20 knew a good deal more about poisons than I believed him to
21 know. It seems to me when I was talking with Dr. Gunn during
22 my late Agency years, and then again when I interviewed him
23 on another matter, that he had a very substantial knowledge of
24 the unorthodox application of medical science to Agency
25 problems, that particular rubric, and I think I should stop

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1 because we're going to slop over into this other matter that
2 Mr. Liebengood wants to talk about tomorrow.

3 Mr. Baron. Well, why don't we hold off then, except
4 that for this one question, which is are you aware of any
5 involvement that Dr. Gunn had in assassination planning?

6 Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not because I'm just not familiar
7 with assassination planning. And specifically, for that
8 reason, I'm not aware of any involvement that Dr. Gunn might
9 have had.

10 Mr. Baron. Let's return now to the point of departure,
11 which was your conversation with Colonel Pash and the events
12 that led up to it.

13 Who were your supervisors that gave you the impression
14 that Colonel Pash was prepared to carry out assassinations?

15 Mr. Hunt. I wish I could give you a distinct name. I
16 think I covered that in an impressionistic way by saying that
17 Tracy Barnes and John Baker, who were at different times
18 sequentially chiefs of the PP staff, it seems to me that Barnes
19 was probably the one who indicated that Pash had such a
20 capability.

21 I know that I did not get it from [REDACTED] and I'm
22 quite sure that my information did not come from within the
23 Southeast Europe Division. It must have come accordingly
24 from the Political and Psychological staff, the contacts there,
25 and I would have to say Tracy Barnes or John Baker are the

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1 most likely.

2 Mr. Baron. And neither of those two men are alive today?

3 Mr. Hunt. That's right.

4 Mr. Baron. Did whoever gave you the information about
5 Boris Pash indicate to you that there were any other units
6 in the CIA that could take care of such problems by means of
7 assassination?

8 Mr. Hunt. No. My distinct impression and recollection is
9 the function, if indeed it existed, and I believed it then
10 to have existed as I do today, was centralized or focused in
11 Colonel Pash and [REDACTED]

12 Mr. Baron. Now what would have been the formal title
13 of the unit that Colonel Pash and [REDACTED] were running?

14 Mr. Hunt. If it had one, I never knew it.

15 Mr. Baron. Can you add any other detail to the record
16 on your talk with Colonel Pash and his reaction to your
17 request that he consider on a general level the planning of
18 an assassination of a suspected double agent?

19 Mr. Hunt. Well, as I recall it, my conversation with him
20 was a relatively brief one. I stepped in the door, met him,
21 saw [REDACTED] who I knew briefly, or at least knew him
22 by sight, and I sat down and I said, we have this problem in
23 the Albanian branch. We may need somebody liquidated in
24 Western Germany. Can you handle it if that day comes, or if
25 it comes to that?

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1 And he seemed a little startled. I have already indicated
 2 that. What I'm trying to do now is to refine my thoughts more
 3 than I did previously when we were taking sort of a wide
 4 swipe at the canvas.

5 Colonel Pash indicated or said to me that it was a matter
 6 that would have to be approved by higher authority and as
 7 a relatively low ranking officer in those days, I thought he
 8 was probably referring to Frank Wisner. And indeed, he may
 9 have. It never got pushed up to Frank Wisner's level because
 10 there no direct approach or a request for such approval
 11 was ever made.

12 I left with the impression that Colonel Pash was glad
 13 that he wasn't going to have any business for me or that he
 14 had successfully deflected whatever approach I might be making
 15 to him because it would give him and [redacted] an
 16 opportunity to drink more coffee and to draw their salaries
 17 from the Agency while affecting to do a job that they were
 18 perhaps not equipped to do.

19 Now again, that impression I had when I left him was at
 20 variance with what I had heard before I came in, where I heard
 21 he and [redacted] or he at least had been active in West Germany
 22 in wet affairs, particularly kidnappings and that sort of
 23 thing.

24 Mr. Baron. And you carried into his office the impression
 25 that Colonel Pash was a man who could carry off an assassination

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1 mission if it were required.

2 Mr. Hunt. If not personally, certainly he could arrange
3 to have it done. That was my distinct impression.

4 Otherwise, I would not have sought him out.

5 Mr. Baron. When you were describing this conversation
6 earlier, you said it was on a hypothetical basis.

7 Is it correct that given the description that you have
8 just enunciated, that you meant by hypothetical basis the
9 fact that you did not yet have the name of the person you
10 were after?

11 Mr. Hunt. That's right.

12 Mr. Baron. But aside from the name of the target, it
13 was a fairly specific request. He knew what you were asking
14 and he knew that there was a real operational problem as
15 opposed to a hypothetical operational problem.

16 Mr. Hunt. That's correct. I can't swear, unfortunately,
17 that I referred to the Albanian problem.

18 Mr. Baron. But you believe you did refer to --

19 Mr. Hunt. He knew, of course, that I came from the
20 Southeast Europe Division, so it could have been any one of
21 a number of countries there.

22 Obviously, we would not have asked him to go into Albania
23 to do the job. It had to be somebody who was outside of the
24 Iron Curtain countries, presumably, in West Germany where we
25 had a great many interests in that era.

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1 Mr. Baron. And it's your best recollection that you did
2 say to him that we might need to liquidate someone in West
3 Germany?

4 Mr. Hunt. That's right, or do you have such a capability?
5 If we have to get to the point of liquidating a body, a target
6 in Europe or West Germany, which I probably said because I
7 had been informed that he was familiar with that scene and
8 had been active there, is this something that you can undertake?

9 Mr. Baron. Did he talk at all with you about the
10 operational problems that might be involved in planning such
11 a mission?

12 Mr. Hunt. He did not.

13 Mr. Baron. He simply reacted in a somewhat surprised
14 way and did not encourage much discussion of the subject.

15 Mr. Hunt. He did not and said, that's something that
16 has to be cleared by higher authority.

17 Now his saying that to me was of course bureaucratically
18 quite appropriate. There was nothing inappropriate in such
19 a response. It neither indicated an enthusiasm for the
20 proposal for that line of work, nor was it a washing of his
21 hands.

22 I felt that he was just glad that he had to reach for
23 higher authority, that it was a deflection and that he would
24 just as soon not hear any more about it, not because of any
25 moral consideration or anything, but simply from a bureaucratic

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1 point of view. He was comfortable where he was and don't
2 bother me.

3 Mr. Baron. So the gloss that you put on the event at the
4 time was that he would rather not be bothered to have to go
5 to work and get a difficult mission done as opposed to his
6 having grave doubts about whether assassination was a proper
7 mission for him.

8 Mr. Hunt. Precisely. And he made it very clear that if
9 anybody was going to get approval for such a thing, it would
10 have to be the people -- that is my division -- that he was
11 not going to go forward. That wasn't his job, but the people
12 proposing such a mission, the division, would have to go and
13 get the necessary approvals, whereupon once that bureaucratic
14 sequence had been accomplished, then that would be up to him
15 to handle.

16 Mr. Baron. Was it your impression when you left that
17 conversation that it was indeed a function of Colonel Pash's
18 to carry out assassinations like this?

19 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

20 Mr. Baron. Was there any follow-up?

21 Mr. Hunt. Albeit reluctantly, because my impression was
22 that he was a man who really didn't want to be disturbed. He
23 was comfortable where he was.

24 Mr. Baron. Was there any follow-up that you were aware
25 of to this request?

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1 Mr. Hunt. No.

2 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone
3 other than Colonel Pash?

4 Mr. Hunt. In that context?

5 Mr. Baron. In the context of assassinations or kidnapping.

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, I wasn't involved in plotting or planning
7 any kidnappings. Again, I would suggest that I might very
8 well have gone back to [redacted] who was the most interested
9 individual, because he was responsible at the branch level
10 [redacted] as an operational tool, whereas, I had an overall
11 political responsibility [redacted] And I have described
12 the background of that, the rubric under which I became
13 interested in the Albanian problem in the first place, and
14 then having talked to Pash, it would have been only natural
15 for me to have said to [redacted] look, I've talked with Pash
16 and he says it will have to be approved by higher authority.
17 Now have you gotten, we don't have a body yet, but when you
18 get a name to put on the target, at that point you will have to
19 carry the ball and take it on up the line.

20 Mr. Baron. And you never heard anything further about it?

21 Mr. Hunt. No, probably because I went within, I think,
22 a comparatively few weeks off to the Guatemala operation.

23 Mr. Baron. Did anyone ever mention it to you, say did
24 [redacted] ever mention it to you again?

25 Mr. Hunt. No. I next saw [redacted] in Taipei in

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1 it would be about '57 or '58, and I had dinner in his home in
 2 Taipei, and I'm quite sure I said at that time, whatever
 3 happened to Boris Pash, or what do you hear from Boris?

4 Now he was a rather unusual individual to say the least,
 5 and I don't think [redacted] told me that he was dead. I don't
 6 know who told me that Boris, that Pash died, but whatever
 7 he said, it was, well, he was okay the last time I saw him
 8 and that was the last time we ever discussed it.

9 Mr. Baron. And you didn't discuss this request?

10 Mr. Hunt. No.

11 Mr. Baron. Where did you receive the impression that
 12 Colonel Pash was dead?

13 Mr. Hunt. I guess when, either from reading the Lawrence
 14 and Oppenheimer book or from the newspapers, from the Crewdson
 15 story. I don't think at the first level when I began recalling
 16 the story, I don't think I was aware that Boris Pash was
 17 dead.

18 Mr. Baron. In the Crewdson story there is an allusion
 19 to the fact that Colonel Pash is probably dead.

20 Are you saying that that came from Crewdson's research
 21 and not from yourself?

22 Mr. Hunt. Oh, yes, that came from Crewdson's research, not
 mine

23 Mr. Baron. This is more than a minor note on the record,
 24 Colonel Pash is not dead.

25 Mr. Hunt. Oh, good, I thought he was dead.

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1 Mr. Baron. He's alive and I have talked with him recently
 2 and as soon as we finish running through your story, I want
 3 to feed to you his response to this story, which appeared in
 4 the New York Times a couple of days ago, and then get your
 5 reaction to that.

6 Are you aware of any cryptonyms, pseudonyms, or file
 7 names that were associated with Pash's operations?

8 Mr. Hunt. I am not.

9 Mr. Baron. When I spoke to Tom Coons, your attorney,
 10 on the phone and asked him to relay some preliminary questions
 11 to you, he came back to me with an account that he said you
 12 had given him of the one other conversation that you had had
 13 with Boris Pash, where he said you had an encounter in a
 14 hallway.

15 Can you describe that?

16 (Discussion off the record)

17 Mr. Baron. While we were off the record we discussed
 18 briefly the account given to me via your lawyer, which was
 19 that you had met Pash in a hallway at some point after
 20 initial discussion of this matter and asked him where it
 21 stood. And he replied this is very heavy stuff. I must be
 22 very selective in talking about it, and you dropped the
 23 matter.

24 Do you have any recollection of such a conversation?

25 Mr. Hunt. I would say that my attorney, with whom I

~~TOP SECRET~~

gsh 42

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1 spoke rather hurriedly by telephone that occasion, has perhaps
2 misinterpreted what I was trying to get across.

3 I think that he has combined the elements of two separate
4 things into one. I believe that he asked me whether or not
5 I had ever seen Pash again, and I said, yes, I must have run
6 into him in the hall or sat down in the cafeteria with him.
7 And the other thing is, and I'm glad you brought this up, that
8 Pash did say yes during the one interview I had with him, yes,
9 I have to be very selective. And in any case, that that has
10 to be approved by higher authority.

11 That is the juncture therē, the joining, not when I
12 talked with him later. At this point I have no recollection
13 of talking about this incident with Pash a second time.

14 Mr. Baron. You said earlier that when Pash referred to
15 higher authority in your mind it probably meant Frank Wisner?

16 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

17 Mr. Baron. Did you have any indication at any point
18 that any higher authority than Frank Wisner --

19 Mr. Hunt. Would be necessary?

20 Mr. Baron. Would ever consider the planning of this
21 assassination mission?

22 Mr. Hunt. I think I see what you're getting at. If I
23 could answer in this way:

24 Considering my relative level in the Agency at that point
25 and the fact that I'd only been in it for five or six years,

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1 my assumption at that time was that authorization by Frank
2 Wisner would have been all that would have been required to
3 proceed with the project had it ever materialized. That is
4 the Chief of the Clandestine Services.

5 Now whether Frank would have been required to go to
6 Allen Dulles, I rather doubt it. I think it is something that
7 he would have been able to authorize himself.

8 Mr. Baron. All right. Let me ask you now before we get
9 into Colonel Pash's version of the story, which we will,
10 whether it is possible that you are confusing the time periods
11 here?

12 So as not to hold anything back from you, Colonel Pash
13 has said that the time period has to be off because he
14 retired from the Agency, or left the Agency in probably late
15 '51. It's possible that it went into 1952. But he wasn't
16 with the Agency in any capacity after '52. And in fact, his
17 status was that of a military officer who had been detailed
18 to the Agency from approximately 1948 to '52.

19 Now does that affect your recollection in any way of the
20 period '54 to '55 as the period when your conversation with
21 Boris Pash took place?

22 Mr. Hunt. Well, from 1950 to 1953, I was in Mexico

23 [REDACTED]
24 Mr. Baron. And where were you from the time that you
25 joined the Agency until you went to Mexico?

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gsh 44

44

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1 Mr. Hunt. I was a member of the PP staff.

2 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that your conversation with
3 Boris Pash about the assassination of a suspected double agent
4 took place in that time period?

5 Mr. Hunt. I would have to say it's possible, yes.

6 Mr. Baron. Would you have been dealing with East
7 European problems or --

8 Mr. Hunt. No, I was dealing with West European problems.

9 Mr. Baron. I'm sorry. Would you have been dealing with
10 a problem like this one, a problem with a suspected Albanian
11 double agent in West Germany during that time period?

12 Mr. Hunt. I can't recall having done so. The West
13 European Division had its own PP staff officer and he would
14 have been the one to take it up, whereas my recollection is
15 that this was generated at a later time when I was in the
16 Southeast European Division and had a direct reason to become
17 interested in the matter.

18 I have to say that it is possible, but I would say maybe
19 5 percent possible.

20 Mr. Baron. And you accord so small a possibility to
21 the hypothesis that you actually talked to Pash about this
22 problem in '49 or '50 because you were not involved in
23 operations in West Germany at that point.

24 Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

25 Mr. Baron. And ~~_____~~ at that
~~_____~~

1 point?

2 Mr. Hunt. No, no. He was not.

3 Mr. Baron. Where were you in '49 and '50 physically?

4 Mr. Hunt. Physically I was in the JRK building with the
5 PP staff and my direct supervisor at that time was [REDACTED]
6 who I have mentioned earlier.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you travel to West Germany during that
8 period of time?

9 Mr. Hunt. No, I did not.

10 Mr. Baron. In the later period, '50, '54, and '55, that
11 you were discussing, did you travel often to West Germany?

12 Mr. Hunt. No.

13 Mr. Baron. You were stationed in Washington?

14 Mr. Hunt. I was stationed in Washington and from the
15 period after I left Mexico, which was in, I think, March of '54
16 for about the ensuing year when I left for the Guatemala project,
17 I was in Washington or the SE Europe Division. So I had
18 that continuous almost year there.

19 Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that adds to your
20 sense of the probabilities that this conversation took place
21 in '54 and '55?

22 Mr. Hunt. No. My restructuring is as I have given it
23 to you, my recollections.

24 Mr. Baron. Okay. Let me ask you the same question in
25 maybe a straightforward manner.

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1 Colonel Pash has testified under oath that the conversation
2 could not have taken place in 1954 or '55. What is your reaction
3 to that?

4 Mr. Hunt. Well, I would say let's pull his Agency file
5 and see where he was in that particular period.

6 Mr. Baron. Are you prepared to say that he is lying about
7 the fact that the conversation could not have taken place in
8 '54 or '55?

9 Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not saying that. I just think that
10 any of us who have been with the Agency for a long period of
11 time, we are now talking about an incident that took place 20
12 years ago, that one man's impression, he is as likely to
13 cling to his impression of the incident as I am, and we almost
14 have a Rashomon type of situation.

15 Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we pull out
16 the article.

17 Were you aware of the functioning of a unit called PB7
18 in OPC?

19 Mr. Hunt. Well, I might have been at that time. I can't
20 recall what it was now.

21 Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash has testified that he did head
22 a small unit in the early days of the CIA called PB7, which was
23 one of 7 units he referred to as planning branches, which
24 had functions much like the functions of the PB staff, as you
25 have outlined them. There was an economic PB, there was one for

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gsh 47

~~TOP SECRET~~

47

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1 political affairs, and his was the 7th, which had less well
2 defined functions. And ~~██████████~~ was a member of that unit.

3 Do you recall any dealings that you had in your earliest
4 period of service with the CIA with PB7, now that I've refreshed
5 your recollection?

6 Mr. Hunt. Not as such, no. Does Colonel Pash define
7 what his functions were in the PB7?

8 Mr. Baron. Before I answer that one, let me ask you one.

9 Mr. Hunt. I've been trying to develop a helpful colloquy
10 here.

11 Mr. Baron. This is very helpful.

12 Do you recall any charters that any of those planning
13 branches had?

14 Mr. Hunt. At this juncture, no. I was only aware that,
15 I think mine was PB2. This is when I first went in in 1949
16 or 1950. I think that was ~~██████████~~ outfit.

17 Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash described the charter of PB7
18 as giving PB7 responsibility for such other functions as the
19 six other units didn't perform.

20 Does that square with your recollection of what he was
21 doing in those early days?

22 Mr. Hunt. Well, you see, I don't associate Colonel Pash
23 with the very early days. I associate him with a later period,
24 about three years or five years later.

25 Mr. Baron. Do you have any specific recollection of Colonel

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1 Pash's activities in the years 1949 to 1952?

2 Mr. Hunt. Not at all, no. My only other collateral
3 recollection is that Colonel Pash was said to have come to us.
4 He was recently assigned in Germany and he had come to us
5 from there. That was all that I knew.

6 Mr. Baron. [REDACTED] who has also testified this
7 past week on this subject, said that his recollection of the
8 charter of PB7 was that it gave PB7 responsibility for
9 assassinations, kidnappings and such other functions as higher
10 authority may assign or as were not being performed by other
11 units.

12 Does that square with the impression that you were given
13 by your superiors of the functions of Colonel Pash's unit?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes. I didn't even know that [REDACTED] was
15 still alive. So [REDACTED] then supports my functional recollection,
16 let's say.

17 Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit 6 an article in
18 the New York Times dated January 8th, 1976, headed "Retired
19 Colonel Denies Heading CIA Unit for Assassinations."

(The document referred to was
20 marked for identification as
21 Hunt Exhibit No. 6)
22
23
24
25

[REDACTED]

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1 Mr. Baron. For the record, Colonel Pash is quoted in
2 this as having "denied to Senate investigators an assertion
3 by E. Howard Hunt, Jr. that the Colonel once headed a
4 Central Intelligence Agency unit set up to arrange for the
5 assassination of suspected double agents."

6 Then the article goes on to say that Colonel Pash is
7 reported to have told the Committee that he had left the CIA
8 and returned to military service during 1954 and 1955. And
9 the story further goes on to quote Colonel Pash as terming
10 Mr. Hunt's assertions, "insidious and completely false."

11 The article then continues:

12 "He said he could not recall ever having met or spoken
13 with Mr. Hunt."

14 And that finally the Colonel said, he was not ever
15 "involved in any assassination planning" between 1949 and
16 1951.

17 Let me just ask you generally for your reaction to this
18 version of Boris Pash's story, and first I ought to add for
19 my own purposes for the record that the story did not come
20 from the Committee. Colonel Pash called the New York Times
21 and gave them the story and even his prepared statement was
22 not made public by the Committee. We simply told him that
23 we have never prevented any witness from saying anything they
24 want to to the press. And he took his story to the press.

25 So now what is your general reaction to his version?

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1 Mr. Hunt. Well, I note that the Colonel has said that
 2 he was never involved in any assassination planning between
 3 1949 and 1951.

4 Now of course in my recollection I put the period of time
 5 several years later, and I am always quite suspicious of non-
 6 service CIA record for a paramilitary individual. And I
 7 could say Lucien Conein, for example, is an individual who
 8 was apparently in and out of CIA and military capacity for
 9 a long span of time, from my own apparent devotion to the
 10 career of foreign service, in the foreign service and out of
 11 the foreign service to the Department of Army and back.

12 So a mere referral to not having been assigned to the
 13 CIA at a particular time is something that I think would bear
 14 a little looking into, as it did in the case of Colonel
 15 Conein.

16 Mr. Baron. All right. Let me take you through the
 17 essential points that Colonel Pash made one at a time. We
 18 have already discussed the discrepancy in your accounts of the
 19 timing of any such conversation, if it did take place.

20 Colonel Pash says that he does not recall ever having
 21 met you and doesn't think he would recognize you on sight.

22 Now does that shake in any way your own sense that you
 23 met somebody that you are sure was Colonel Pash?

24 Mr. Hunt. In my recollection, he's a rather short man,
 25 probably balding, if not totally bald. He wore glasses and

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1 I'm giving that to you from a ten-minute talk to him 20 years
2 ago.

3 Mr. Baron. Next, Colonel Pash says it is possible that
4 assassinations was part of the charter of his unit at the
5 CIA PB7 on paper but was never any kind of active function of
6 that unit, nor, he has testified, was he knowledgeable of any
7 assassination planning or activity at the CIA during his
8 service there.

9 How does that square with your recollection?

10 Mr. Hunt. Well, I think I indicated in my earlier
11 testimony that what I had heard about Colonel Pash was hearsay,
12 that I had heard that he had been active in Western Germany
13 for the Agency and this was before he came back to Washington
14 in a staff capacity, that he had been able to handle things
15 over there, and now he was the man at headquarters who could
16 handle and arrange this sort of thing. So there may be a
17 distinction. Maybe what I heard about him was totally false.
18 Perhaps he was not involved in that kind of activity but I
19 relate him in memory to West German activity of the type
20 that we have been discussing, rather than to his being freneti-
21 cally active at headquarters with relation to field operations
22 in West Germany, that he was a guy who could get things
23 done because he had had prior experience in Germany, and of
24 course I have to rest my case there.

25 That's what I heard about him. I did not go up to him and

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1 say, Colonel Pash, I understand you've had a lot of hits in
2 West Germany and can you do the same for us? I didn't go into
3 that. I just said, I've been referred to you for the following
4 reasons, and I went on into my very brief presentation. He
5 reacted and I left.

6 Mr. Baron. As you have testified, you did make it
7 unmistakably clear to Colonel Pash in that one conversation
8 that you were suggesting the assassination of a suspected
9 double agent and inquiring as to his capability to carry -
10 out such a mission.

11 Mr. Hunt. That is correct.

12 Mr. Baron. Where does that leave you then in evaluating
13 the truth of his testimony that no such conversation took place
14 and that he was never asked to even consider planning an
15 assassination mission?

16 Mr. Hunt. I never asked him to plan an assassination
17 mission. I simply asked if he had the capability and his
18 response was a deflective one, that it was a matter that would
19 have to be approved by higher authority.

20 But I left with no doubt that I had been referred to
21 the right place.

22 Mr. Baron. Since we don't have his testimony in front
23 of us -- it has not been transcribed yet -- I don't want to
24 accord my own memory greater precision than it deserves. But
25 if Colonel Pash's testimony can be fairly read to have asserted

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[REDACTED]

1 with real certainty that no such conversation took place and
2 that even in terms of exploring the possibility of assassination
3 planning or inquiring into the capability for assassination
4 planning, he maintains that assassinations were never raised
5 with him, what do you then have to say about his
6 testimony?

7 Mr. Hunt. I would have to say that his perceptions and
8 mine were at variance and that we were engaged in some sort
9 of an Aesopian dialogue in which neither of us understood
10 what the other was saying.

11 I had no other reason to approach him. I had never heard
12 of the man except in that particular context.

13 Mr Baron. And there was no other reason for them
14 discussing capabilities for an assassination?

15 Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

16 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any specific function that
17 Colonel Pash performed with the CIA after the date of 1952?

18 Mr. Hunt. Well, my recollection is that I saw him in
19 '54 and '55 and that's the only specific function that I can
20 relate him to.

21 Mr. Baron. Now you have drawn a chart of the PP staff,
22 Exhibit 4, that locates Colonel Pash and [REDACTED] on the
23 PP staff.

24 Is it possible that they served on the PP staff before the
25 date the Colonel Pash gives as his retirement date from the

[REDACTED]

1 CIA, which is sometime in '52?

2 Mr. Hunt. Is it possible? Yes, I believe it's possible
3 because [REDACTED] was one of the original people in OPC.

4 Mr. Baron. At what point did OPC merge or was it
5 transformed?

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, it merged with OSO, I think, in 1953
7 when I was [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] in Mexico in '53, and
9 I came out of there in, I think, March of '54, I left Mexico.

10 By that time the merger had taken place.

11 Mr. Baron. So is it possible that this chart could have
12 been a chart of the PP staff as it operated under the OPC
13 structure, the 453?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact, I don't think that there was
15 any particular change from the PB to the PP era.

16 Mr. Baron. The reason for my own confusion here is that
17 Colonel Pash and [REDACTED] have both said that at the
18 point when OPC was merged, or at some point shortly thereafter,
19 PB7 was abolished and they don't know what became of it.
20 They say the functions that these seven planning branches
21 performed were scrambled and reorganized and they were never
22 sure exactly who carried through the functions that had
23 previously been assigned to PB7.

24 Mr. Hunt. Well, I never heard any more about it.

25 Just for perhaps a bit more clarification, the labor

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1 unit or branch as it appeared in the PP staff following the
2 merger, that had the same function and the same personnel as
3 let's say whatever PB enumerated or numerical designations.
4 So it's just a question of terminology. I can see that for
5 chronological purposes you are interested in how I recall it,
6 whether I recall it by a PB numerical designation or by --
7 But since I never knew what the Pash- [REDACTED] unit was designated,
8 whether it was designated by a word or by a number, it
9 doesn't help me at all. And for that reason I can't be
10 of more assistance to you.

11 Just go see Colonel Pash. He's in such and such an office
12 down there.

13 Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

14 (Discussion off the record)

15 Mr. Baron. For the record now, while we were off the
16 record we agreed to continue this session a while to get into
17 one or two other areas. But I have a couple of questions to
18 tag on to the end of this one.

19 First of all, [REDACTED] in his testimony to the
20 Committee, said that he had no recollection of a conversation
21 with you where he was present, and you discussed assassination
22 of a double agent, or the planning for such a mission with
23 Colonel Pash and himself.

24 Do you, even having heard his testimony, still have a
25 clear recollection that [REDACTED] was present when you

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1 had this conversation?

2 Mr. Hunt. I do, because to the best of my knowledge and
3 belief, it was the first time that I had met [REDACTED]
4 That is, I had seen him in the corridors, but it was the
5 first time that I was able to append a name to the particular
6 individual who I had come to recognize visually.

7 My memory is further jogged in this respect, that [REDACTED]
8 having identified me as a member of the SE division of the
9 staff, at a later time but not much later, talked to me about
10 the possibility of his being assigned to the SE division.
11 And my recollection of the conversation is that [REDACTED] told
12 me that he was a great friend of [REDACTED]
13 and that this friendship should be put to use for the Agency's
14 benefit, and it could be best done by his being transferred
15 to SE division for ultimate assignment to Athens.

16 Mr. Baron. Do you have from anything in your experience
17 in the CIA any personal animosity toward Colonel Pash or
18 [REDACTED]

19 Mr. Hunt. On the contrary. I've always regarded myself
20 as a friend of [REDACTED] and I only had one contact
21 with Boris Pash. And I have no feeling about him one way
22 or the other except that in his recent book I read about his
23 involvement in the Manhattan Project and I certainly admired
24 his contribution to national security in that era.

End 2A, b. 25

Mr. Baron. In [REDACTED] testimony, he gave us an
[REDACTED]

gsh 57

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1 account of an incident when he was stationed at [REDACTED] and he said
 2 had written a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a propaganda ^{that he}
 3 program because he was involved in propaganda operations at
 4 that point. And he said, unbeknownst to him, someone else
 5 in his station with the approval of the Chief of Station
 6 attached an extra paragraph to this cable which suggested the
 7 assassination of Chou En Lai in preparation for the Bandoeng
 8 Conference where Chou En Lai was supposed to be an important
 9 spokesman on behalf of many Asian nations.

10 And the way that [REDACTED] recounted the incident,
 11 he knew nothing about the paragraph that had been attached to
 12 his cable until the reply came back very strongly in the
 13 negative and eventually, a high ranking CIA official came out
 14 to [REDACTED] to reprimand everyone involved in the incident for
 15 suggesting assassination.

16 Do you have any recollection of that incident?

17 Mr. Hunt. No, I have no knowledge. What year does
 18 [REDACTED] far to because I was in [REDACTED]
 19 [REDACTED] Tokyo from, oh, about '55 to
 20 '56 or '57. And I would have seen most of the traffic that
 21 came out of [REDACTED] in that period of time. But I don't know
 22 if -- I know that [REDACTED] stayed on in [REDACTED] much after my
 23 time in the Far East.

24 I don't know when the Bandoeng Conference took place. I
 25 remember it, of course, but I don't remember the year.

TOP SECRET

gsh 58

58

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1 Mr. Baron. It appears to me that the Bandoeng Conference
2 took place, according to [REDACTED] testimony, in 1955
3 and that the incident he was describing was either in '55 or
4 late in '54.

5 Mr. Hunt. I had no recollection of it whatever. [REDACTED]
6 is not suggesting that is some basis for personal animosity,
7 I trust.

8 Mr. Baron. No. He did say, though, that you might have
9 had knowledge of that suggestion, although he wasn't sure of
10 it. He said you were involved at that time in a place where
11 you might have seen cable traffic like that.

12 Mr. Hunt. That's quite right, but I never saw that
13 traffic.

14 Mr. Baron. Let me pick up one last general question for
15 the moment at least on assassinations.

16 Do you have any knowledge of even the consideration of
17 assassinations at high levels of the American government?

18 In other words, we have been using the term higher
19 authority and I would like to use it for the moment now to
20 refer to the level of the DCI or the National Security Council,
21 the President, his close White House advisors, Cabinet
22 officials, and the DCI.

23 Do you have any knowledge of any people at that level
24 seriously considering assassination planning?

25 Mr. Hunt. No, none. I think you have to bear in mind
[REDACTED]

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1 that most of my time with the Agency I was abroad and only
2 in the few years prior to my retirement when I decided to
3 retire did I really come back and become a headquarters type.
4 But the rest of the time in my entire career I was abroad.

5 The only reference I recall is the one that I have
6 testified about following my survey trip to Havana when I
7 provided a list of written recommendations to Dick Bissell
8 and Ed Barnes in which I recommended the assassination of
9 Castro by patriotic Cubans, and later on when Bissell said
10 that the matter was in the hands of a special group or
11 possibly the special group, and I can't discriminate at this
12 point between the two, was I aware that Bissell himself --
13 well, I still believe that Bissell himself was sufficient
14 authority for something like that. I didn't know you needed
15 to go beyond it. I didn't think it was a matter of the 40
16 Group or the National Security Council had to become concerned
17 with.

18 Mr. Baron. And once again, you were not aware of any
19 follow-up to your suggestion?

20 Mr. Hunt. Well, yes. Bissell said the matter -- perhaps,
21 of course, again, we had the situation where I'm talking about
22 a suggestion that I made, and I said to Bissell, what about
23 that recommendation, and he says it's in the hands of the
24 special group or the special group.

25 Actually, as we now know, that was a satisfactory answer

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1 to me and I was surprised when on invasion day Castro was
2 alive. I now realize from testimony that Harvey and others
3 have given that the matter had been discussed long before my
4 arrival on the scene and it was in hand one way or the other.

5 Mr. Baron. When was your arrival on the scene?

6 Mr. Hunt. Spring of 1960. I transferred up, I actually
7 made my trip to Havana the summer of 1960, and then we had
8 the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April of '61.

9 Mr. Baron. Now it is my own recollection of our
10 assassination report that no action was taken to carry out
11 an assassination plan against Castro as early as the spring
12 of 1960.

13 Did something --

14 Mr. Hunt. No. I've giving you, I guess, a bureaucratic
15 answer. I was officially transferred back to Washington in
16 the spring of 1960 and I took some leave en route in Spain

17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]

19 Eventually I made my way back to Washington in the spring
20 and early summer and got on the scene within a few days of
21 my actually reporting into the project managers, i.e., Bissell
22 and Barnes, who decided I would go down to Havana for a period
23 of time, and I went down for about a week and came back, and
24 by that time we were talking maybe July or so.

25 Mr. Baron. July of '60?

[REDACTED]

gsh 61

61

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1 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

2 Mr. Baron. Was it your impression at that point that
3 assassination planning was under way?

4 Mr. Hunt. No.

5 Mr. Baron. When did you make this recommendation to
6 Richard Bissell?

7 Mr. Hunt. Within a few days after my return from Havana.
8 Now I never heard from Bissell about the matter until some
9 months later, and I think I described this in my book, most
10 of which I put together in '67. I described coming back to
11 Washington. I had been aware, coming back from the Miami
12 area where I was operating, I was hearing all of these things
13 about bazookas and telescopic rifles and so forth and sort
14 of assuming that all of this was a result of the recommendation
15 that I had made. And then Bissell's response to me was, well,
16 what has happened to my recommendation, and he said, well,
17 it's in the hands of the special group.

18 And from that time on I never inquired further. Sub-
19 sequently I was told about poison cigars, which I thought was
20 an ancillary effort probably to the main one. It might have
21 a target of opportunity. But that was not the main effort.

22 Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

23 (Discussion off the record)

24 Mr. Baron. So your written recommendation would have
25 been made approximately in the summer of 1960?

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Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Before we move away from Cuban operations, let me show you one cable that we have which is from [redacted] and it appears to be to CIA headquarters because it is marked IN 75100, and it is dated September 16, 1964 in handwriting that was put on the copy that we have by the Agency.

This is not the original copy of the cable but it appears to be a copy that was deleted and paraphrased for the purposes of providing it to the Committee in the early days of our inquiry.

We will mark this as Exhibit 7.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 7)

[redacted]

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1 Mr. Baron. You have had a chance to read this cable
2 now?

3 Mr. Hunt. I have.

4 Mr. Baron. I told you while we were off the record and
5 I will reiterate now that Agent 1 appears to be a paraphrase
6 or a substitution for AMLASH/1.

7 Were you aware of the operations of AMLASH/1?

8 Mr. Hunt. No, I was not and I don't know his true name.

9 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a major in the Cuban army
10 who was fairly close to Fidel Castro and who was a leader among
11 the students at the Havana University who was cultivated by
12 the CIA as a contact?

13 Mr. Hunt. No. I may have been contemporaneously, but
14 so many people were cultivated by the Agency in those days.
15 Everybody was doing it, but I had no specific knowledge.

16 Mr. Baron. Does it refresh your recollection if I tell
17 you that AMLASH/1 was Rolando Cubela? C-u-b-el-a.

18 Mr. Hunt. I know that there was such a person, but I
19 never had any contact with him and I know nothing about him.

20 Mr. Baron. Do you know anything about the incident that
21 is described in this cable?

22 Mr. Hunt. None at all. I'm sure that the reference in
23 paragraph five is not to me.

24 Mr. Baron. The sentence that says, "Quite likely, Eduardo
25 will never appear to contact subject."

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1 Mr. Hunt. That can't conceivably have been a reference to
2 me.

3 Mr. Baron. Why is that?

4 Mr. Hunt. Because I had not been involved in Cuban
5 activities for more than three years at that time. I was
6 purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay
7 of Pigs.

8 Mr. Baron. You said you did operate out of Madrid for a
9 period of time but it was later than September of '64?

10 Mr. Hunt. No. Let me clarify that.

11 I was sent to Madrid in either '64 or '65. I can't
12 recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] My
14 communications were handled independently between myself and
15 Tom Karamessines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans.

16 This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms.
17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.

19 Mr. Baron. And did you have any knowledge of a relationship
20 to a plan to assassinate Castro, supposedly to take place
21 during a university ceremony?

22 Mr. Hunt. No.

23 Mr. Baron. Let's move on now to an entirely different
24 area, and I will ask you to begin by describing your general
25 role in the middle of the 1960s on the CA staff with regard to
[REDACTED]

gsh 65

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65

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1 press publications or press placements or any responsibilities
2 you may have had for media relations.

3 Mr. Hunt. After Allen Dulles's resignation and retirement,
4 I was assigned for about a period of a week to the CA staff
5 and I then transferred to the newly set up Domestic Operations
6 Division under Tracy Barnes, which was really the Commercial
7 Operations Division, although it was never so-called.

8 I was the first Chief of Covert Action for the Domestic
9 Operations Division and we inherited as a new division a number
10 of projects that had been running for a period of time, that
11 had been run by the commercial staff of the Agency and by a
12 number of the geographic divisions.

13 The purpose of turning these ongoing projects over to the
14 Domestic Operations Division was to centralize contacts with
15 publishers in the United States for the benefit of geographic
16 divisions such as the Asian or Far East Division which might
17 want a book published on [REDACTED] for a particular purpose.
18 They would come to Tracy Barnes with a particular request.

19 And I should say that the relationship with the [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] Publishing Company had been in existence for quite
21 a period of time and I think they were managed by Cord Myer
22 International Division, if I'm not mistaken, or possibly the
23 CA staff. But what we received were ongoing operations. We
24 were sent the case files for the [REDACTED] project,
25 for the [REDACTED] project, for the [REDACTED]

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1 organization, which had been operating out of the National
 2 Press Building in Washington. We had a project in [redacted] which
 3 I visited on one occasion called [redacted] which we ran
 4 out of a [redacted] Virginia office.

5 I had no personal media contacts with American magazines
 6 or newspapers, if that is the thrust of your question.

7 Mr. Baron. Actually, I'm interested in this whole area,
 8 both contacts with specific reporters or media people dome-
 9 stically or contacts with publishing houses or contacts abroad
 10 in the publishing field.

11 Mr. Hunt. Well, I've given you the names of the publishing
 12 houses that we had contact with. I did on one occasion meet
 13 and I can't recall the purpose of it, it was a very large
 14 textbook publishing house and their main offices were in
 15 New Jersey. If I had an annual for publishers, I could pull
 16 it out.

17 But beside from that publishing house, we never did any
 18 business with them. I don't recall of any publishing houses
 19 beyond [redacted] that is trade publishers, that
 20 we dealt with.

21 We had our own press agency, [redacted] which I
 22 imagine you're quite familiar with.

23 Mr. Hunt. Can you describe the standard mode of
 24 operating with these various publishing outlets?

25 In other words, how would you have supplied them with

[redacted]

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1 material? Would you urge them to publish a manuscript they
2 already had from another source? Would you give them a
3 manuscript that CIA personnel had written under a pseudonym?

4 Mr. Hunt. I don't think that ever took place, to my
5 knowledge.

6 What I recall is [redacted] meeting with Tracy Barnes
7 and me or individually, either in Washington or New York during
8 this period and saying I have a great book I would love to
9 publish, but it's not economically feasible, and I think it
10 would be good for you people abroad for the following reasons.
11 And we might come up with the differential or we might not.

12 I don't recall any Agency-created manuscripts that were
13 sent to [redacted] or for that matter, any other publisher.

14 I recall we had a lot of accounting problems with [redacted]
15 and finally we got really almost bogged down in arguments
16 about back copies. It was a little on the nightmarish side.
17 We did turn out some good books, but I couldn't give you a
18 title at this point. But I'm sure that they are a matter of
19 record within the Agency.

20 Mr. Baron. What was the nightmarish aspect of it?

21 Mr. Hunt. Well, apparently, before the project came under
22 DOD, it had been handled on a very freewheeling basis by the
23 previous project managers. [redacted] got everything he wanted
24 from the Agency in terms of subsidy money and expense money
25 and publicity money and that sort of thing and when we took

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1 it over it was brought under -- I hesitate to use the term
2 professional management, but I do so in a qualified sense in
3 that I was the only one, I guess, who knew anything about the
4 publishing industry, who had ever been connected with the
5 project. So I knew a little about it.

6 And at that time, with the help of our own commercial
7 people within the Division, our accountants and auditors and
8 so forth determined that there were a number of aspects of
9 our fiduciary relationship with the [REDACTED] company that would
10 bear greater investigation.

11 So the relationship from a freewheeling one prior to our
12 DOD managerial take-over, it became from a freewheeling thing,
13 it became sort of an unpleasant continuous argument about
14 dollars and cents, rather than functional matters.

15 Mr. Baron. Out of what funds at the CIA did these monies
16 come from that we were giving to [REDACTED]

17 Mr. Hunt. I wouldn't have any idea, project money.

18 Mr. Baron. Who signed off on the project money?

19 Mr. Hunt. Well, it would depend on how much it cost.

20 I think that Karamessines could sign off up to \$50,000 and
21 beyond that it had to be signed off on by Helms, I think. That
22 my best recollection. And I don't know -- as annual review
23 was conducted, and of course the division chief had to approve
24 it.

25 Mr. Baron. Did the operation involve companies other than
[REDACTED]

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1 the ones you've mentioned? In other words, supplying funds
2 to companies other than the ones you've already mentioned?

3 Mr. Hunt. I don't know of any. None that I knew of.
4 I would be very surprised if a memorandum showed up saying
5 that we were dealing with Random House, for example. I just
6 don't recall now.

7 Mr. Baron. Was there any other aspect to your liaison
8 with these publishing houses other than their seeking funds
9 to publish books that you were interested in having published?

10 Mr. Hunt. Only this, that the USIA was, I think, finally
11 brought into a formal relationship with DOD, at least my
12 part of it, and the head of the book division at USIA and I
13 would meet from time to time and he would indicate that he had
14 a good one that we really ought to do rather than USIA and
15 vice versa. And he knew fully of the [REDACTED] relationship.

16 Mr. Baron. Can you describe the process that you would
17 go through to ensure the publication of a book that the CIA
18 was interested in having published? An example that I was
19 given by somebody on our staff who has been looking into this
20 was books written by or ghosted for Chinese [REDACTED]

21 Mr. Hunt. As I recall it, the Chinese branch sort of
22 ran a parallel operation. I don't recall their coming
23 through us. I don't recall a [REDACTED] book when I was in
24 that particular job. What I do recall is, I remember the
25 Near East Branch bringing to our attention a book that they

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1 would like to have [REDACTED] publish, and it had to do with the
 2 [REDACTED] border dispute, the name of which I can't
 3 recall. So the manuscript would have been read by [REDACTED]
 4 or his principal assistant, and he would give an indication
 5 of what he thought the marketability was. And at that point --
 6 well, in this instance, we got the funds from the Near East
 7 Division. When it came down to that, why should DOD, who had
 8 no interest in the [REDACTED] dispute, provide money for
 9 that particular piece of propaganda. So the money would be
 10 transferred somehow from the Near East Division's allocation.
 11 It would be their project, but we would be the managers of it
 12 when it got down to the point of dealing face to face with
 13 [REDACTED] on the matter. My office would keep the division
 14 apprised of the project, when publication could be expected,
 15 and so forth.

16 Mr. Baron. Were there any other CIA publishing proprietaries
 17 than the two you have mentioned [REDACTED]

18 Mr. Hunt. That I had personal knowledge of within the
 19 Domestic Operations Division, no.

20 Mr. Baron. You qualified that by saying within the
 21 Domestic Operations Division. Were there others?

22 Mr. Hunt. Because the international operations or Inter-
 23 national Organizational Division under Cord Myer, ran quite a few
 24 things in conjunction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom,
 25 for example. Radio Free Europe, those things that went on.

1 Mr. Baron. Did CIA do ghostwriting for non-CIA publi-
2 cations?

3 Mr. Hunt. I ghosted a couple of -- I'm very reluctant
4 to go into this, although I have discussed it with John
5 Crowdson. But this is another one of those difficult areas
6 where it's very hard for me to prove.

7 There came a time in the spring of, I think it was the
8 spring of about 1969, when the Soviet Russia Division asked
9 me if I could cause to have published something on the --
10 by this time I was no longer with the Domestic Operations
11 Division. I was with Western Europe -- on the increasing use
12 by the [REDACTED] and things like that,
13 and Christ, I hope this doesn't get out.

14 And so I went to Helms. Howard Osborne was then Chief
15 of the Division, as I recall. He was late Director of
16 Security, and this had been staffed out. And I prepared the
17 article and it appeared in large portions unchanged under the
18 byline of [REDACTED]. And it was not a fabricated article.
19 It was just information which was supplied which he wrote
20 somewhat in his own style, and there was a second article which
21 appeared a month or two months later, and this was done by
22 Dick Helms.

23 Mr. Baron. Also under [REDACTED] byline?

24 Mr. Hunt. Yes. You could understand the difficulties
25 involved here and I don't need any more enemies. I have plenty.

[REDACTED]

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Now that is my own personal contribution to that sort of thing. But I can't think of anything else that was done.

Mr. Baron. By other people? Was it a general practice to supply either prefabricated articles or the material for articles to favorable press contacts in this country?

Mr. Hunt. Well, we know about the [redacted] book, [redacted] which was largely a cooperative venture with the Agency, and that was done by the SR Division.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Now in that case, you see, the SR reached out on its own. Penkoski Papers was another example. We had nothing to do with that in DOD. That was done, again, by SR division. And I can understand why.

But basically, in answer to your question, I have given you everything that I have personal knowledge of.

Mr. Baron. When you made the arrangement with [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. I made no arrangement with him.

Mr. Baron. Who handled liaison with him?

Mr. Hunt. Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. And was that a one-on-one arrangement or were there other people knowledgeable?

Mr. Hunt. I believe it was a one-on-one, old school tie arrangement.

Mr. Baron. Was there any list kept at the CIA of favorable

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1 media contacts who could be counted on to disseminate a story
2 that the CIA was interested in disseminating?

3 Mr. Hunt. I would have to say yes, but I wouldn't know
4 where it was kept other than either Karramessines's office
5 or Dick Helms had it.

6 Mr. Baron. Were such media contacts utilized to disseminate
7 derogatory information about the targets of some CIA
8 operation?

9 Mr. Hunt. I can't recall any such incidents.

10 Mr. Baron. Were they used to disseminate information that
11 might have some impact on diplomacy?

12 In other words, say --

13 Mr. Hunt. American diplomacy?

14 Mr. Baron. Yes, in preparation for a meeting between
15 American leaders and leaders from another country, the CIA
16 might hypothetically want to disseminate a certain kind of
17 information.

18 Do you know if that kind of thing was done?

19 Mr. Hunt. I suspect that it was. It certainly was within
20 the general thrust of what we were trying to accomplish.

21 But let me go back to something that I think is pretty
22 fundamental that we have not gotten into yet.

23 Neither USIA nor CIA had a charter that allowed it to
24 propagandize the American public. And this is one of the
25 difficulties that I had when I took over the managership of the

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1 [REDACTED] organization. I felt that a strict
 2 construction of the CIA charter made the project quite suspect
 3 because if we were doing a book, for example, on [REDACTED]
 4 Communism, who was the target? It would have been highly
 5 inappropriate for United States citizens to be the target
 6 of the particular book, and we did a hell of a good book on
 7 [REDACTED] Communism. It became about this thick. I can't
 8 recall the title.

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[REDACTED]

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1 If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They
2 don't all necessarily read English, and we had a [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED] So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is
5 published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca.
6 then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this
7 was rationalized by the project review board that looked over
8 the [REDACTED] operation, and the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED] and things like that was that the ultimate target was
10 formed, which was true, but how much of the [REDACTED] output
11 actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.

12 Now, in the case of [REDACTED] the material was
13 physically mailed from Washington to foreign targets, the
14 [REDACTED] newspapers, I think particularly the [REDACTED]
15 Agency was a client. The mere fact that the project was
16 rooted in the United States gave it sort of a credibility
17 lustre abroad in that particular era. If it came out of
18 Washington then it was probably okay.

19 But I -- [REDACTED] had no domestic U.S. papers
20 as clients. What I'm trying to get at is that DOD handled
21 operations which were based domestically in the United States,
22 the commercial operations, and this includes proprietary
23 airlines and things like that, whose ultimate target was
24 abroad. The principal target or even a tangential target was
25 not the United States citizen.

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1 Mr. Baron. But, with anything that was published in
2 English, the United States citizenry would become a likely
3 audience for the publication?

4 Mr. Hunt. A likely audience, definitely.

5 Mr. Baron. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure
6 that things that were published in English were kept out of
7 or away from the American reading public?

8 Mr. Hunt. It was impossible because [REDACTED] was a
9 commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to
10 be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. Again. I
11 say it was a matter of great difficulty. Mr. Barnes resolved
12 all that philosophically, and I simply carried out the dicta.

13 Mr. Baron. What was your philosophical opinion of the
14 danger of propagandizing Americans?

15 Mr. Hunt. Well, I knew that it was not a part of the
16 Agency charter, and it was a matter that the USIA looked at.
17 I talked about it occasionally. The USIA coincidentally had
18 come under some criticism at that time for subsidizing certain
19 publishers in the United States. That became known; I don't
20 recall how. I discussed with the USIA book man and with
21 Barnes the danger that we might be criticized for the same
22 reasons. I was never enchanted with the [REDACTED] operation. I
23 thought it cost far too much money and had minimal benefits
24 abroad, and further, we had the liability, the vulnerability
25 to quite reasonable criticism that we had U.S. citizens as a

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1 target, or an audience, I should say.

2 Mr. Baron. Were there any precautions taken against
3 dissemination in America of publications by CIA proprietaries
4 in English?

5 Mr. Hunt. Proprietaries, well, my only personal knowledge
6 is the ~~operation~~ operation which I say was simply mailed
7 out of Washington. That was the only precaution, rather than
8 our people mailing them themselves.

9 Mr. Baron. Were any techniques used to prevent contamina-
10 tion of American intelligence by picking up on things that the
11 CIA was actually publishing or arranging to have published?

12 Mr. Hunt. I would assume so, and I would guess that that
13 would be done in the first instance by the knowledgeability of
14 the reports officers in the various geographic divisions at
15 headquarters who would scan newspapers, for example, or they
16 would receive raw reports from ~~let's say~~ let's say, and see that
17 there had been a big sale of a particular book which we had
18 sponsored, which they knew we had sponsored but nobody else
19 knew. Of course, ~~would have known about~~ would have known about
20 it, too.

21 So I would say that it was a pretty good fail-safe. The
22 area of knowledgeability was high. For one thing, I traveled
23 some in those days. I traveled to Bombay. I talked to the
24 ~~there~~ there. I traveled to New Delhi and talked to
25 ~~there~~ there, who was my CA opposite number, and

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1 keep them up to date as to what we were planning. I would do
2 the same in France and so forth.

3 Mr. Baron. Were there any specific instances that you know
4 of of an eventual placement in the U.S. press of a story that
5 the CIA generated or fabricated abroad somewhere? For instance,
6 a story could conceivably be picked up by the UPI or by Reuters
7 that the CIA had planted abroad.

8 Mr. Hunt. I can't recall anything significant. I would
9 guess that during the Cuban, during the days of maximum
10 Cuban operation that sort of thing happened. I would think it
11 would be unavoidable, but I can't specify.

12 Mr. Baron. And are there any other instances than things
13 you have mentioned of direct placements of stories in the U.S.
14 press by the CIA?

15 Mr. Hunt. I have mentioned the [REDACTED] which was a
16 cooperative venture with [REDACTED] the two [REDACTED]
17 things. No, I can't recall.

18 Mr. Baron. I touched earlier upon the possibility of
19 disseminating derogatory information about Agency targets. These
20 were you aware of any general program of that nature to discredit
21 either a foreign political leader or a foreign political fac-
22 tion, or domestic political groups or leaders?

23 Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no. Domestic, I am
24 not aware of any.

25 I think the Soviet Russia division was quite active, and it
[REDACTED]

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1 kept a list, for example, and maintained a very good list of
 2 KGB officers abroad, and when one would show up at Luanda, for
 3 example, they would make sure that the local press got the
 4 man's dossier, or at least a blind handout so that they would
 5 know who the fellow was, much as the Butz counterspy operation
 6 is doing today against the CIA.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you make arrangements, or did you know
 8 of arrangements being made for non-CIA authors to write pieces
 9 that were favorable to the CIA?

10 Mr. Hunt. No.

11 Mr. Baron. There was no funding of that kind of opera-
 12 tion?

13 Mr. Hunt. You mean sort of flackery, the favorable
 14 publicity for the Agency, is that what you imply?

15 Mr. Baron. Right.

16 Mr. Hunt. No.

17 Mr. Baron. What about subsidizing non-CIA authors to
 18 write stories of any sort, or books of any sort that the CIA
 19 was interested in having published?

20 Mr. Hunt. I would say this in a qualified sense. Where
 21 in the past we had given [redacted] a commitment to buy X copies
 22 of his book on the [redacted] problem, obviously
 23 we were subsidizing the author of that book because it was
 24 our money that [redacted] was ultimately passing to the indi-
 25 vidual, but that was [redacted] doing it rather than us. In

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1 other words, there was never any face to face contact.

2 Mr. Baron. Aside from dealing through publishing houses
3 that you had established contact with, did you deal individually
4 with authors who were non-CIA employees?

5 Mr. Hunt. I did not. I don't think DOD did. I think that
6 Far East Division did.

7 Mr. Baron. Do you know with whom?

8 Mr. Hunt. You mentioned Chinese [REDACTED] for example.
9 Well, they dealt also, the Soviet Russia division dealt with
10 [REDACTED] on the Penkoski case. In fact, I had lunch with
11 [REDACTED] while he was doing the Penkoski Papers. So that was
12 an example.

13 Mr. Baron. Did they have a regular program?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes, I think so.

15 Mr. Baron. Both of those two divisions?

16 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

17 Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you think we would
18 need in order to have a fairly clear, complete picture of the
19 relations to the media or the publishing industry?

20 Mr. Hunt. Well, I think you could get probably a good
21 deal more information from Cord Myer, who had a lot of that
22 directly under him when he was Chief of the International
23 Organizations Division, and of course, he served as Deputy
24 Chief of Clandestine Services for quite a while. He would
25 probably have as panoramic knowledge as anybody. I guess he's

[REDACTED]

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1 still in London.

2 Mr. Baron. Let me move you back to Allen Dulles's heyday
3 at the Agency and ask you -- and this is at a very general
4 level, for some sort of picture of first, your relationship
5 to Dulles and secondly, the way he operated and made decisions,
6 both formally and informally.

7 Mr. Hunt. Well, my direct exposure to Allen Dulles began
8 in the wake of the Bay of Pigs when I was transferred to his
9 office until I guess just before his retirement, by Dick Bissell.
10 They needed somebody in Dulles' office to -- I believe I've
11 covered this in my autobiography, as a matter of fact -- to
12 answer the many questions that were coming in to the Agency
13 from let's say the "Green Committee," that was investigating
14 the Bay of Pigs failure, and the press, the New York Times;
15 a lot of questions were being posed to Allen Dulles and to the
16 Agency about the Bay of Pigs, and I had about as good a view
17 of certainly the political background of the effort as
18 anybody because I directed it for a period of time until just
19 before, when I resigned that post.

20 Mr. Dulles at that time was very harrassed. Bobby Kennedy
21 was harrassing him almost daily at these meetings. The story
22 had been put out, of course, that this was a CIA failure.
23 None of us associated with the project, least of all Mr.
24 Dulles, believed that for a minute. We looked upon it as a
25 failure of nerve by the New Frontier since what had happened

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1 was that we had made the -- the President had given certain
2 undertakings to Cuban leadership and to our own paramilitary
3 people, and had failed to carry them out.

4 However, this fact was successfully disguised for a number
5 of years, but Dulles and Dick Bissell paid the price.

6 In any events, the Bay of Pigs cost Dulles his leadership
7 of the Agency, and I had the utmost respect for him. I was
8 associated with him as an assistant for the special Cuban
9 Bay of Pigs purposes, for a period of several months prior to,
10 perhaps six months prior to his eventual retirement.

11 I had had occasional contacts with him as a [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] and I had seen him in Japan when he came over there
13 and we had some discussions. Mr. Dulles brought into the
14 formal Central Intelligence Agency the same feeling of esprit
15 de corps that we had all enjoyed in the Office of Strategic
16 Services, and this was largely lost during the McCone director-
17 ship. And I think we had some admiral after that, Admiral
18 Radford, possibly. We got under a group of managers, and the
19 human element that we had enjoyed in OSS was gone with the
20 passage of Allen Dulles until Dick Helms came back in. You
21 see, I'm an unrepentent admirer of Allen Dulles and the way we
22 used to do business. Why do I say that? Because the way we did
23 business during Mr. Dulles's directorate was precisely the way
24 we did it in OSB during General Donovan's creation and direction
25 of that organization. In OSS, which was Allan Dulles's training
ground as much

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1 as mine, you had the feeling that no idea would ever be stifled
2 simply for lack of a hearing. General Donovan was open to
3 all sorts of suggestions just as Allen Dulles was later, and
4 this was a great feeling for creative minds within the Agency,
5 during a large part of my career, that if you had a good idea,
6 it would be reviewed, considered and accepted or rejected on
7 its merits.

8 Mr. Baron. Let me break in here because the hour is
9 getting late now and I don't want to stretch this out too long.
10 But I would like to get to any specific information you might
11 have or impressions you might have had of the way Allen Dulles
12 would deal with Presidents or the National Security Council.

13 Mr. Hunt. I have no knowledge of that area at all. Of
14 course, when President Eisenhower was in office, Mr. Dulles'
15 brother was Secretary of State, and it was at that same time
16 that we began the successful Guatemala operation. We
17 certainly had President Eisenhower's hearty endorsement, and I
18 can only assume from the fact that we never had any difficulties
19 or criticisms that Mr. Dulles had the best possible rapport
20 with at least that particular President.

21 Mr. Baron. Were you personally aware of the nature or
22 the frequency of Allen Dulles' contacts with President Eisenhower

23 Mr. Hunt. No.

24 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the style with which he
25 made decisions along with a President on a major covert

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operation, namely, were these decisions always made in a formal fashion before the NSC, or some subunit of the NSC, or were they made informally?

Mr. Hunt. I have no information on that.

Mr. Baron. Why don't we stop here for today.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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Exhibit 1

STATEMENT BY E. HOWARD HUNT

A year ago when Congress established the Church Committee, Senator Baker was quoted as saying that I would be an early witness. I was then free on Appeal and readily available to testify concerning CIA involvement in allegedly illegal activities. Moreover, I viewed testifying before the Committee as a further opportunity to testify under oath concerning my total non-involvement with Messrs Oswald, Bremer and Sirhan, persons with whom my name has been slanderously and libelously linked in press and electronic media. Although I had been interviewed previously by the FBI and the Rockefeller Commission with regard to these allegations a host of assassination buffs and media advocates continued irresponsibly to associate me with the deaths of the Kennedy brothers and the crippling of Governor Wallace.

My Appeal denied, I re-entered prison in April, 1975. Three weeks later US Marshals escorted me to Washington DC for what turned out to be a three-hour interview with a new Watergate Assistant Special Prosecutor. For a 9-day period I was lodged at the Leesburg, Va., jail, and finally returned via Detroit and Tallahassee where I was imprisoned in the isolation area before being driven on May 26 to Eglin Federal Prison Camp. On May 27, Assistant Committee Counsel Michael Madigan telephoned me to say that the Church Committee wanted to interview me "within the next two weeks". I apprised Mr. Madigan of Public Law 93-209, Title 18, Sec. 4062(c) Para. 1 (amended) which authorizes minimum security prisoners such as myself to be furloughed for up to 30 days for purposes of testifying. Counsel Madigan agreed to my testifying on this furlough basis.

Over the summer, however, I heard nothing further from Mr. Madigan or his Committee associates. Then in mid-September a Washington POST story alleged that I had been assigned by a White House superior to assassinate columnist Jack Anderson. Senator Church was thereupon quoted as saying that his Committee would investigate the charges. I welcomed this apparent

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opportunity, for the allegations had gained wide credence while my own delayed response appeared only incompletely in the press. Still, nothing was heard from the Committee.

In December 1975 John Crewdson of the New York Times interviewed me in prison. He asked if I knew anything about "CIA assassination capabilities", and I related to him my encounter with Col. Boris T. Pash. Mr. Crewdson then inquired whether the Church Committee had interviewed me. I responded in terms of the foregoing, noting that I would have testified about the Pash encounter had I been given the publicized opportunities. My interview with Mr. Crewdson was published and shortly thereafter my attorney was contacted by a representative of the Committee.

I consider it highly discriminatory that the Committee is unwilling to have me testify in Washington as a furloughed witness. Further, the Committee's refusal to postpone interviewing me in prison until one of two counsel familiar with my career and affairs is available places me in a difficult position with regard to representation by informed legal counsel. And, as during the Ervin Committee hearings (whose cost in legal fees to me approached \$100,000) I must again pay legal fees occasioned by the interest of the Senate in a matter of no discernible benefit to me.

Between last January and April I could freely have traveled to Washington to testify at the pleasure of the Senate. From then on I could have been furloughed for that purpose and testified accompanied by customary counsel who are not now available to me. Nevertheless, in demonstration of my willingness to cooperate fully with the Senate I agree to be interviewed under oath today.



E. Howard Hunt

January 10, 1976

S Div.

C/PP/SE
HUNT

C/FI/SE

C/SE

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RICHARDSON

DC/SE

ALBANIA

RUMANIA

GREECE

YUGOSLAVIA

TRIESTE

BULGARIA

BASE


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
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Exhibit 4



[DD/P] Wiener

Exh. 15



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p. 9. line 6: sub: "for" for "with".

line 15 - quotes.

10 - J-K-L

p. 9 line 15 - LEWIS

p. 22 line 15 - [REDACTED]

17 et seq. = HARVEY

25 l. 21 - The Special Group

30 l. 13 - NAGUIB

45 l. 4 - J O R K

l. 5 - [REDACTED]

l. 8 TRACY

Jan 20

566 ... wide

l. 23 BARON

674 ... 26 ...

5 = l. 5, 12, 15, 18, 23

76 - l. 11 - y

77 l. 5 - "COUNTERSPY"

78 l. 10, 11 y